Professional role enactment amid information warfare : War correspondents tweeting on the Ukraine conflict by Ojala, Markus Mikael et al.
 1 
 
This is a revised article manuscript whose final and definitive version has been 
published in Journalism, 26 September 2016. The published article is available online 
at https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884916671158 
 
 
Professional Role Enactment Amidst Information Warfare 
War correspondents tweeting on the Ukraine conflict 
 
Markus Ojala, University of Helsinki, Finland 
Mervi Pantti, University of Helsinki, Finland 
Jarkko Kangas, University of Tampere, Finland 
 
Abstract 
War correspondents work within a networked media environment characterised not only by an 
explosion of information but also a wide range of actors producing competing narratives and 
viewpoints. This study examines the ways in which war correspondents enact their professional 
roles when tweeting from within a conflict zone. The analysis sheds light on the conditions of 
modern information warfare in the context of reporting from within the Ukraine conflict. It also 
identifies the emerging social media practices of war correspondents and the different role 
categories that journalists are adopting on Twitter. 
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Introduction 
In the context of modern conflicts and wars, Twitter features as a boundless news environment in 
which facts, eyewitness accounts and viewpoints can be disseminated, verified and contested by a 
wide range of actors. Undermining its inherently pluralising and democratising character, the 
platform also turns into a hotbed of disinformation and confrontation as conflicting parties attempt 
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to mobilise support and discredit their adversaries. In circumstances in which digital media have 
been effectively subverted to propaganda purposes, as has been the case in the on-going Ukraine 
conflict (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015; Boyd-Barrett, 2015), news professionals become 
unavoidably entangled within information warfare regarding the definition of the conflict (cf. 
Siapera et al., 2015). Therefore, it is important to understand how war correspondents – as the key 
mediators between the public and the conflict – deal with contemporary information war and how it 
might affect the enactment of their professional roles. 
The relationship between new media technologies and changes in journalistic practices and 
styles figures prominently in journalism scholarship. While there is a rapidly growing number of 
studies concentrating on how news organisations and professional journalists use Twitter as a 
journalistic tool and how it may change journalistic norms and daily practices (e.g. Canter, 2015; 
Hermida, 2013; Lasorsa et al., 2012; Lawrence et al., 2013; Revers, 2015), hardly any attention has 
been paid to war correspondents’ use of Twitter. Changes in both the information environment and 
in modern warfare are mounting new pressures on reporters in conflict zones and may influence 
their practices and journalistic production, or the ways in which they conceive of and enact their 
role as journalists. 
Drawing on research on the journalistic uses of Twitter, journalistic roles and conflict 
reporting, this study examines the ways in which Finnish war correspondents enact their 
professional roles when tweeting about the Ukraine conflict. Foreign correspondents use Twitter as 
a reporting tool but, at the same time, they also present and define themselves as journalists on the 
platform. Accordingly, we argue that by studying correspondents’ tweets we can further our 
knowledge of the specific challenges of journalistic work in conflict zones and discover more about 
the role that war correspondents enact in contested information environments.  
In the next two sections, we provide a brief overview of modern information warfare in the 
new media ecosystem and discuss previous studies on how journalists use Twitter, as well as the 
implications for how journalists enact their role. This is followed by a description of the data 
collection methods and analysis used in our research. We then provide an overview of our findings, 
presenting four distinct roles that are performed by correspondents when tweeting on the Ukraine 
conflict. We conclude with a discussion of the ways in which Twitter may shape the traditional 
roles of journalists covering international conflicts. 
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Twitter as an arena for conflict 
Since early 2014, the political crisis in Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged international conflict 
and a military confrontation that has claimed over 9,000 casualties and internally displaced over 1.6 
million Ukrainians (European Commission, 2016). Perceptions differ on whether the military 
dimension of the conflict should be regarded as primarily a civil war between the central 
government and separatist insurgents in the eastern Ukraine, a war between Ukraine and Russia, or 
a de facto ‘proxy war’ between Russia and the West locked in mutual animosity (e.g. Ishchenko, 
2014; Motyl, 2015; Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa, 2015; Sakwa, 2015; Wilson, 2014).  
What is clear, however, is that the Ukraine conflict has evolved into one of the most hotly 
contested ‘information wars’ since the end of the Cold War, with all parties claiming to be its 
victims (e.g. Boyd-Barrett, 2015; Galeotti, 2015; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015; Snegovaya, 
2015). As a consequence, the Ukraine conflict has been a particularly challenging for Western 
journalists: not only is reliable and impartial information scarce – as most of the relevant sources 
are parties to the conflict, the involvement of the United States and the EU in the conflict also poses 
difficult questions regarding objectivity and non-partisanship.  
Efforts to control information and shape media narratives and consequently public 
perceptions are elementary aspects in international conflicts (McCauley, 2015; Tumber and 
Webster, 2006). Yet, new information technologies and social media have reshaped both the 
conduct and spaces of modern information warfare (Grondin, 2012; Tumber and Webster, 2006). 
As regards the mediated dimensions of warfare, the new media ecology not only gives rise to the 
multiplication of actors and sites of information management, it also enables unprecedented forms 
of control, deception and offense. Digital media may be particularly suitable for the conduct of 
information warfare due to the low cost and ease with which disinformation and propaganda can be 
produced and distributed globally across social networking sites (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010; 
Kuntsman and Stein, 2015). 
Twitter is among the new battlefields of information warfare in which claims of truth 
emerge and are critiqued. It has become integrated into military operations and harnessed for public 
relations campaigns during wartime (Maltby et al., 2015; Kuntsman and Stein, 2015; Siapera et al., 
2015). Yet as governments and militaries launch (dis)information offensives on Twitter, they are 
met with counter-propaganda by the insurgents or terrorist organisations they are fighting against 
(e.g. Zeitzoff, 2014). The attempts of conflicting parties to control information are, in turn, 
undermined by the efforts of humanitarian organisations, international observers, the news media 
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and media advocacy groups to provide more “truthful” accounts of the events (Khaldarova and 
Pantti, 2016; Omanga and Chepngetich-Omanga, 2013). 
While there is a rapidly growing number of studies that concentrate on journalists’ uses of 
Twitter, less attention has been paid to how it affects professional war reporting. Even though the 
Internet and social media platforms enable governments, rebel groups, NGOs and citizens alike to 
publish and distribute information directly and bypass journalistic gatekeeping, journalists remain 
key mediators between the public and the conflict’s participants (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2011; 
Meraz and Papacharissi, 2013; Tumber and Webster, 2006). At the same time, correspondents’ 
tweets from the battlefield are incorporated into Twitter’s ever-evolving stream of information and 
shape the visibility of competing definitions and interpretations of the conflict (cf. Meraz and 
Papacharissi, 2013). 
When using Twitter, Ukraine conflict reporters thus inevitably become entangled in the 
information warfare taking place on Twitter. Even as journalists’ reports form a key part of the 
information flow on Twitter (Bruns, 2012), their work also falls under the continuous scrutiny of 
their audience and becomes a target of contesting truth-claims and abuse. The online attacks against 
journalists are related to the fact that individual reporters are better able to generate visibility than 
news organisations on Twitter because visibility is driven by an individual’s personality (Bruns, 
2012). In the context of the Ukraine crisis, both interested citizens and the ‘Russian troll army’ 
(Hoskins and O Loughlin, 2015) have employed social media to spread information and 
disinformation, as well as to distort and criticise news accounts, question the legitimacy of the 
sources cited and insult reporters. The way that conflict reporters feel the brunt of such online abuse 
is captured by a tweet from Shaun Walker, Moscow Correspondent for the Guardian, on 27 July 
2014, a day when fighting between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russia separatists was raging in the 
Donetsk region and an international monitoring team was prevented from visiting the crash site of 
Malaysian airliner: “My morning Twitter/email. As usual I’m Kiev whore & Kremlin troll 
simultaneously. Thanks for constructive feedback!”  
As all tweets from personal opinions and interpretations to eyewitness reports and retweeted 
links to external content may be subject to hostile commentary, correspondents need to work out 
practices with which to confront the efforts of interested parties in order to influence facts, 
evaluations and interpretations. At the same time, the public role of war correspondents – what it 
means to be a war correspondent and what purposes does a reporter serve in a conflict – is 
potentially being redefined in Twitter’s contested media environment. 
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Professional role enactments on Twitter 
While the role and performance of journalism during wartime has been a vibrant area of study (e.g. 
Freedman and Thussu, 2003; Tumber and Palmer, 2004; Matheson and Allan, 2009; Zelizer and 
Allan, 2011), less attention has been paid to how war correspondents actually enact their roles and 
how these roles may be affected by changes in communication technologies, on the one hand, and 
modern information warfare, on the other (Kramp and Weichert, 2014; Tumber and Webster, 2006).  
Journalistic roles are cultural conventions of the tasks journalists should perform in society. 
It is assumed that journalists internalise certain role conceptions on the basis of their perception of 
what news organisations, audiences, sources, key reference groups and society as a whole expect 
from them. Yet the personal role conceptions do not necessarily correspond with journalists’ actual 
role enactment (Tandoc et al., 2013; Mellado and Van Dalen, 2014; Carpenter et al., 2015), which 
always takes place in social interaction and within a particular social context (Hellmueller and 
Mellado, 2015; Mellado, 2015). When covering the Ukraine conflict, the war correspondents’ 
enactment of their journalistic role on Twitter is thus fundamentally influenced by the context of 
Twitter’s information war and interaction with other users of the platform. 
Disseminating information, interpreting events, and confronting societal powers are among 
the most widely studied journalistic roles (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2015; Tandoc et al., 2013). They are 
also the most recognised worldwide, although notable variations between countries exists 
concerning their relative significance (Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Hanusch and Mellado, 2014; Wilnat et 
al., 2013). Nevertheless, various other roles, including advocate, loyal facilitator and civic mobiliser 
have been identified (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2015; Mellado, 2015), and digital and social media 
environments have been suggested as giving rise to an even wider plurality of journalistic roles 
(Fahy and Nisbet, 2011). At the same time, journalists must grapple with various tensions regarding 
their professional roles (Kramp and Weichert, 2014). These include the adoption of a detached 
versus an involved role; concentrating on disseminating facts versus taking an interpretive role 
requiring analysis and explanation; and their role as a conduit for a variety of societal voices versus 
being an advocate for a chosen cause (Hanitzsch 2007; Christians et al. 2009; Tandoc et al., 2013). 
The tensions regarding journalistic roles are potentially reflected in how journalists operate 
on Twitter. For instance, journalists have been found to struggle to balance journalistic impartiality, 
objectivity and accuracy against the speed, transparency and openness that social media encourage 
(Gulyas, 2013; Molyneux, 2015). Previous studies have noted that journalists are becoming more 
open to talking about their work and sharing personal life details on Twitter, and the platform also 
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encourages them to express opinions and regularly use humour to maintain connections (Lasorsa et 
al., 2012; Holton and Lewis, 2011; Mourão, 2015). However, journalists also continue to 
incorporate traditional journalistic norms and roles in their use of Twitter (Hermida, 2013; Lasorsa 
et al., 2012). They tend to, for instance, maintain and reclaim their gatekeeping authority by 
selectively mentioning, retweeting, and hyperlinking content from other journalists and elite 
sources, rather than inviting a more open debate (Lasorsa et al., 2012; Lawrence et al., 2013; 
Noguera Vivo, 2013). Overall, Twitter seems to reproduce tensions in journalistic roles as the 
inclinations of journalists to meet the perceived expectations of their followers clashes with 
traditional professional norms (cf. Mourão, 2015). 
Material and methods 
Our qualitative analysis examines the tweeting on the Ukraine conflict made by three Finnish 
foreign correspondents based in Moscow. Of the three, Pekka Hakala is staff correspondent for 
Helsingin Sanomat, Finland’s leading national daily, Anna-Lena Laurén writes for 
Hufvudstadsbladet, the leading Swedish-language newspaper in Finland, as well as for Svenska 
Dagbladet, a leading Swedish newspaper. Erkka Mikkonen reports for YLE, the Finnish public 
service broadcaster, which has four TV channels, several radio channels and a prominent online 
presence. All three correspondents frequently went to Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 to cover the key 
developments in the conflict. Due to their position as correspondents for leading national media 
institutions, they are among the most influential journalists covering the Ukraine conflict in the 
Finnish news. At the same time, all three correspondents work for traditional media institutions that 
have a culture of high professionalism and which emphasise quality in their reporting. 
We observed the correspondents’ tweeting practices from 12 April to 12 May 2014, a period 
which covers the early stages of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and received extensive 
attention from international media. The escalation of violence followed the seizing of administrative 
buildings and police stations by anti-government insurgents in several eastern Ukrainian cities and 
the announcement of a military campaign against the rebels by the interim government in Kiev 
which had been installed after the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych in February. Separate 
incidents were reported in and close to Donetsk, Sevastopol, Mariupol, Kramatorsk and elsewhere 
in the region. In addition, clashes in eastern Ukraine coincided with violent riots in Odessa, where 
over 40 people were killed in a trade union building fire on 2 May 2014. The reasons for the failure 
of the Odessa police to prevent the deaths, and the involvement of the Russian government in 
inciting separatist insurgency, were hotly contested issues in the information warfare during this 
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period. All three correspondents made at least two reporting trips from their base in Moscow to 
Ukraine during this period and continued to regularly tweet on the conflict in Moscow.  
We collected all the tweets posted by the three correspondents during the period, which 
allowed us to observe differences in the tweets posted from the conflict area with those posted from 
the base. In total, the data consisted of 487 tweets, of which 66 were posted by Hakala, 126 by 
Laurén and 295 by Mikkonen. The tweets were collected with Snapbird, a free web service that 
allows for the retrieval of up to 3200 past tweets from a single account (cf. Vis, 2013: 30). To work 
out their journalistic role enactments on Twitter, we conducted a qualitative analysis of each of the 
three correspondents’ manifest tweeting practices during the data collection period. Drawing on 
earlier studies of journalists on Twitter (e.g. Lasorsa et al., 2012; Molyneux, 2015; Papacharissi and 
de Fatima Oliveira, 2012; Vis, 2013), we concentrated not only on the formal aspects of the tweets 
(e.g. the use of hashtags, retweets, links to outside content, mentions of other screen names) but also 
on their actual argumentative content (e.g. eyewitness observation, statement, opinion, request, 
expression of humour). Unlike a quantitative approach employing big data sets, a close reading of 
the data allowed for taking into account the subtlety of opinions and interpretations that tweeters 
typically convey through the use of irony and sarcasm (cf. Molyneux, 2015). The smaller amount of 
data also allowed us to pay specific attention to the context of each individual tweet as they often 
exist in direct connection with other tweets. For instance, whenever a tweet was a reply to another 
user, we followed the link provided by Snapbird to the original tweet on Twitter, and thus observed 
the interaction between the correspondent and the other user(s) in its entirety. 
A guiding premise in the analysis of our observations was that: on Twitter, the 
correspondents enact their roles not only with reference to events in the Ukraine conflict they 
personally witness (journalists mediating between the audience and the ‘real world’ of the conflict) 
but also with reference to the information war waged outside the actual conflict zone. In other 
words, Twitter is a public space in which the correspondents enact their roles by, implicitly or 
explicitly, taking positions with other sources of information and in interaction with other users. 
Accordingly, the analysis of the journalistic role enactments consisted of working out the general 
purpose of each of the tweets (e.g. description, interpretation, curating), the primary addressee of 
the tweet (e.g. general audience, own followers, specific users) and the level of personal 
involvement expressed (e.g. detached, involved, the opinions manifested).  
In the following analysis, we focus on four main roles enacted on Twitter by the Finnish war 
correspondents: disseminator, interpreter, advocate and community-builder. We observe how the 
correspondents enact their roles in tweeting on the Ukraine conflict, paying specific attention to 
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how particular tweet types and conventions are appropriate to the enactment of the roles. Moreover, 
the analysis illustrates how the interactive dimension of Twitter communication is a key element in 
the enactment of the roles, and also how the interaction brings out tensions between journalists’ role 
enactment and the roles attributed to them by other Twitter users. 
 
Performing the role of war correspondents on Twitter 
The disseminator: First-hand observations and news updates 
Twitter, and social media in general, have been said to contribute to the stretching of journalists’ 
social space in such a way that reporters do not have to ‘go out there’ anymore to find information. 
Presenting and explaining the war and the suffering involved to their audiences truthfully is a main 
function of war correspondents. Journalistic claims to truth-telling are enabled by particular news 
practices – in which the on-site presence (eyewitnessing) is key (e.g. Carlson, 2009; Zelizer, 2007). 
With the proliferation of digital cameras and mobile devices, the role of the eyewitness is partly 
becoming ‘outsourced’ to citizens and other ‘non-conventional journalists’ with digital cameras 
(Zelizer, 2007: 425). However, a journalist’s actual presence at a location continues to carry great 
significance in conflict reporting (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti, 2013; Cottle, 2012). 
The emphasis on being a first-hand eyewitness was a key element in how the correspondents 
presented themselves on Twitter. The most apparent characteristic in the studied correspondents’ 
use of Twitter was the notable increase in the amount of first-hand observations about their 
immediate surroundings, compared to their tweeting from outside the conflict zone. Eyewitness 
tweets mostly consisted of descriptions of the witnessed actions and emotions of the people present 
at a scene. Of the three correspondents, Erkka Mikkonen was the most active tweeter of first-hand 
observations, typically describing events in the present tense and tweeting several minute-by-minute 
updates from a scene: ‘Hundreds of pro-Ukrainians marching in central #Odessa towards ministry 
of the interior. Many have bats and helmets’ (4 May 2014, 11:29am); ‘Shouting “Odessa is part of 
Ukraine!”’ (4 May 2014, 11:30am). The correspondents frequently complemented their verbal 
eyewitness reporting by posting their own photos of the scenes they were covering. As the photos 
were typically used to illustrate or corroborate the tweeted observations, they functioned as further 
claims of ‘being there’ and reinforcing reporters’ credibility (cf. Butler, 2005: 824; Zelizer, 2007: 
418).  
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While very prominent, eyewitnessing was not the only way for the correspondents to enact 
the role of disseminator on Twitter. They also posted tweets and retweets with the purpose of 
reporting on important developments in the Ukraine conflict, typically concerning the actions or 
statements of the parties involved. These were particularly significant ways of disseminating 
information when the correspondents were in Moscow, away from the actual scene of the conflict. 
Often these news update tweets and retweets included a headline and a link to an online news 
report. Laurén and Mikkonen were also active in linking to their own reports, whereas Hakala 
refrained from promoting his own work. The sharing of one’s own articles on Twitter has often 
been identified as a form of self-promotion (e.g. Canter, 2015; Lasorsa et al., 2012; Molyneux, 
2015), and this was evident especially in Mikkonen’s tendency to retweet other users’ links to 
online news stories that featured himself as reporter or eyewitness. Yet, even as elements of self-
promotion have seeped into journalists’ social media practices, in the context of foreign 
correspondence, linking to one’s own articles also fulfils the principle purpose of informing 
audiences about relevant developments within the conflict. 
Traditionally, the role of disseminator casts the reporter as a detached observer who reports 
events as they develop. On Twitter, the shortness of the messages allows the correspondents to 
describe actions, motives and general moods without the need for any ’balancing’ views or 
assessment of the broader significance of the events. However, despite their apparent neutrality, the 
correspondents’ first and second-hand observations have an important role in Twitter’s information 
warfare. Even when presenting only fragmented pieces of information from a narrow perspective, 
the disseminator effectively directs attention to particular aspects of the event and thus participates 
in defining what the conflict is about. In this regard, hashtags are particularly useful as they allow 
correspondents to insert their observations into Twitter’s constantly updating stream of discussion 
concerning the conflict. It was found that the studied journalists preferred a small set of well-
established hashtags, such as #Ukraine, #Russia, #Odessa and #Slovyansk for reaching as broad an 
audience as possible on Twitter. 
One of the ways in which correspondents, in their position as neutral disseminators of 
information, suggest political interpretations is through the naming of the involved parties in the 
Ukraine conflict. Whereas the Kiev government has frequently labelled the eastern insurgents as 
’terrorists’ since April 2014, the Western news media have mostly settled with the apparently more 
neutral term ’pro-Russian separatists’. However, in the early stages of the escalation of hostilities 
the terms were not yet stabilised and there was considerable opposition to the usage of the ‘pro-
Russian’ label due to its arguable misrepresentation of the cause of the opposition and connotations 
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with Russian involvement in the conflict (Ishchenko, 2014). This hotly contested ground of 
information warfare became evident when Mikkonen was challenged on Twitter for his use of the 
term ’pro-Russian’. On 3 May 2014, he posted a photo of marching citizens accompanied with a 
tweet: ‘A procession of pro-Russians shouting honour to the heroes of #Odessa’. A few minutes 
later, a Finnish magazine journalist replied to the tweet, inquiring whether it would be more apt to 
‘invent’ a more ‘descriptive’ label for the protests. In a subsequent tweet, the colleague kept driving 
her point by offering alternative terms, including ‘pro-autonomy’, ‘anti-Kiev’ and ‘pro-Eastern 
Ukrainian’. Mikkonen replied by acknowledging the validity of the original question but also 
defended his use of the term ‘pro-Russian’.  
This exchange highlights the highly controversial issue of naming parties in the Ukraine 
crisis, especially concerning the terms used in describing anti-government groups and movements 
(see Boyd-Barrett, 2015: 3–4). In the conditions of the information warfare of the Ukraine conflict, 
the apparent neutrality and ‘rawness’ of first-hand observations are thus  challenged by the fact that 
all claims about reality exist in relation to the broader narratives of the conflict. When tweeting their 
observations from the scene, the correspondents, wittingly or unwittingly, participate in the 
corroboration or refutation of competing conflict narratives. 
The interpreter: sharing views and opinions 
In addition to sharing their first-hand observations and updates about unfolding events in the 
conflict, the correspondents used Twitter to post and retweet links to views, analyses and opinions 
from experts, other journalists and citizens. In providing followers and the Twitter public with 
answers to questions as to what the conflict is essentially about, which groups are driving events 
and what are their motives, the correspondents enacted the role of the journalist as ’interpreter’ (e.g. 
Carpenter et al., 2015). As with the role of the disseminator, the interpretive role of the journalist 
does not involve explicit personal opining on the issues tweeted. However, the neutral role does not 
preclude mediation on the opinions of others: by linking and retweeting, journalists were able to 
pass along comments from other users without, at least ostensibly, accepting accountability for that 
message (cf. Molyneux, 2015). In the context of Twitter’s information war – in which a vast range 
of conflicting accounts and interpretations are available, the position of journalists as interpreters 
boils down to questions such as whose information is passed on and which sources are endorsed. 
Retweeting other users’ messages inevitably shapes the salience of the views and opinions 
circulating on the microblog; the act communicates that the view, claim or bit of information 
retweeted is important to take into consideration. 
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Real time eyewitness tweeting, which forms the core of the war correspondents’ 
disseminator role, is afforded by Twitter’s immediacy, likewise, the role of the interpreter that is 
enacted primarily through retweeting and linking is supported by the platform’s other main 
affordance: connectivity. There was, however, notable variation in how the three correspondents 
acted. Laurén did not retweet other users’ messages and did little linking to outside sources. Instead 
she emphasised her own role as an analyst by linking to her own writings, many of which were 
columns and analyses instead of news reports. In contrast, Hakala did not promote his own 
reporting on Twitter but frequently retweeted opinions, assessments and views, especially from 
renowned international journalists with large followings on Twitter, including Howard Amos, Alec 
Luhn and Leonid Ragozin. Mikkonen, in turn, was an active curator and retweeter of analyses and 
views from a variety sources. At the same time, adapting journalistic values to the practice of 
tweeting, he tended to flag shared content with such headers as ‘opinion’ or ‘point of view’. For 
instance, on 7 May 2014, he shared a link to a Moscow Times editorial with the following comment: 
‘Opinion: #Russia's Self-Isolation by @MoscowTimes www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/arti…”. 
While sharing interpretations of others, the correspondents rarely presented their personal 
analyses of the events. This reluctance to adopt an authoritative position on the conflict was 
illustrated by Mikkonen, who was requested by a user, on 6 May, to make a personal assessment of 
the balance of power between the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian populations in Odessa. When 
specifically prompted, he did provide a brief evaluation in two tweets, accompanied by the caveat 
‘it is difficult to assess’. Yet the brief exchange with the follower underlined the overall absence of 
such broader evaluations and assessments in the typical tweeting practices of these correspondents. 
The advocate: raising public awareness and promoting an ideological position  
Much of the activity that the journalists engaged in on Twitter concerned the struggle to find 
reliable information about the Ukraine conflict, the effort to qualify and evaluate information and to 
fight against propaganda. They tweeted in response to queries about the facts they had reported and, 
more typically, highlighted the existence of rumours and propaganda and disqualified purportedly 
erroneous claims concerning events in Ukraine. The third role performed by the correspondents 
through tweeting, the advocate against propaganda, was thus explicitly connected to the conditions 
of conflict, and information warfare in particular. In terms of traditional journalistic roles, it can be 
seen as an extension of the advocacy role, which refers to journalists’ attempts to raise awareness of 
a perceived problem and/or actively influence opinion formation processes among their audiences 
(Donsbach and Patterson, 2004; Stanham, 2007). Importantly, this role extends the political agency 
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of war correspondents, allowing them to openly be actors in the conflict and have greater 
opportunities for focusing attention on different interpretations of events.  
For example, as early reports of the clashes in Odessa circulated on 2 May 2014, indicating 
that a large number of anti-government activists had been killed in a fire following clashes with 
nationalist groups, Hakala posted the following observation: ‘twitter rage #odessa seems to be 
almost unanimous: #ukraine nazis burnt 40 innocent, something must be done’. Here Hakala 
implicitly voiced his concern not only against one-sided interpretations, but also against attempts to 
present the incident in a way which would play into the preferred narrative of the Russian state 
media about the rise of far-right nationalist tendencies in Ukraine after the ousting of president 
Yanukovych. The following day, Hakala continued to fight this narrative of the Odessa incident by 
pointing to its apparent unlikeliness: ‘#Odessa That a 5-storey Stalin era stone building would be 
burnt inside entirely by throwing petrol bombs from outside? #ukraine’. 
As Hakala’s tweets illustrate, the correspondents’ own voice is typically saturated with 
irony, to emphasise their ‘incredulity’ regarding certain interpretations of events and to discredit 
their presenters. Journalists’ use of humour on social media and Twitter has been studied in terms of 
attracting the public (Holton and Lewis, 2011). Here, the use of comic devices, such as irony, is to 
be understood as a critique, as a way to discredit certain claims and parties to the conflict as 
untrustworthy and even ridiculous (cf. Glasser and Ettema, 1993). At the same time, irony typically 
assumes that the audience has pre-existing knowledge of events and shares the views of the speaker. 
Accordingly, as opposed to the ordinary news reporting that assumes the reader has little pre-
existing information, many of the tweets posted in the advocacy role seemed to be directed at, and 
aimed to build rapport with, a well-informed and like-minded audience that was capable of 
identifying inauthentic information and outlandish interpretations.  
In this regard, it is notable that the correspondents tended to bring attention mostly to the 
dissemination of disinformation that supported the Russian narrative of the conflict and presented it 
as a major hindrance in uncovering the truth. In addition to journalists’ efforts to inform readers 
about the complex information war, their advocacy efforts revealed an ideological anti-Russian 
stance. As contesting versions of events circulated in public after a fatal shooting incident in 
Slovyansk in April, Mikkonen retweeted a fellow journalist’s assessment, which underlined just the 
issue: ‘Pictures from #Slovyansk indicate something did happen. Now the hard part: try to measure 
Right Sector stupidity vs. pro-Russian propaganda’ (20 April 2014). The fact that the journalists are 
Moscow correspondents may partly explain their tendency to flag and ridicule specifically (pro-
)Russian disinformation. Yet their disposition reflected the broader distrust in the West of the 
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claims of Russian authorities and media, amounting to a widespread perception that Russia is the 
primary, if not the only, party in the Ukraine conflict engaging in information warfare (Galeotti, 
2015; Snegovaya, 2015). In this regard, Laurén stood out from her colleagues by also tweeting 
about what she saw as propaganda disseminated by the Ukraine Crisis Media Center, a news agency 
financed by, amongst others, George Soros, the Ukrainian government and a Ukrainian subsidiary 
of Weber Shandwick, one of the world’s leading public relations firms. Also, by calling out, on two 
separate occasions, faulty claims made by a US magazine, Laurén also highlighted the 
untrustworthiness of some of the Western reporting on the conflict. 
The community-builder: job talk and professional support  
Journalists have a tendency to share daily experiences related to their work on Twitter (Lasorsa et 
al., 2012) and our findings suggest that job-related tweeting has a significant role in conflict 
reporting as well. This public ‘job talk’ has been argued to potentially increase journalistic 
transparency and to foster trust and more intimate relations between journalists and their audiences 
(Molyneux, 2015; Noguera Vivo, 2013). All three correspondents frequently shared their personal 
experiences from the field on Twitter. First of all, stationed in Moscow, the correspondents 
typically informed their followers when they were about to embark on a reporting trip to Ukraine, 
and secondly, they frequently shared their experiences of moving from one location to the next, 
tweeting mostly about road blocks, destroyed bridges, alternative connections, and accreditation 
issues.  
Rather than being directed at the general audience, in the context of reporting from military 
conflict zones, the job-related tweets often seemed to have the purpose of tipping off, advising or 
warning colleagues who were possibly travelling in the area. Laurén, for instance, tweeted on 5 
May 2014 about a road block: ‘Roadblock about 10 kilometres from Odessa. Not a soul was 
guarding it, except for two friendly GAI-men (road police)’. Unusually, the tweet was written in 
English, instead of the usual Swedish or Finnish used by Laurén on Twitter, which indicates that 
she intentionally directed it to an international readership, most probably to her colleagues present 
in Ukraine – even though the absence of hashtags limited the likely recipients to her followers on 
Twitter.  
In addition to alerting fellow journalists, the correspondents used Twitter for other types of 
interaction with colleagues. Firstly, they posted to promote other journalists’ work in various ways: 
linking to news reports and articles and retweeting other journalists on Twitter (cf. Lawrence et al., 
2014), as well as informing their followers of the presence of other Finnish reporters in Ukraine. 
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Here, the use of the @ handle was indicative of the correspondents’ purpose of directing users to 
follow their colleagues on Twitter. Secondly, the correspondents tweeted other journalists to create 
and strengthen personal connections. Hakala, for instance, contacted a Danish correspondent in 
Moscow in order to introduce himself and to thank the correspondent for a story and interview 
which Hakala quoted.  
Thirdly, on several occasions the correspondents expressed support for their fellow 
journalists. It often consisted of simple wishes like ‘welcome’ or ‘stay safe’, directed at their 
Finnish colleagues entering the conflict zone, but it also included the retweets and reporting of 
international journalists who had been arrested, kidnapped or were otherwise in trouble. Finally, the 
correspondents entered various informal and not directly job-related exchanges with their 
colleagues. Indeed, it was notable that while the reporters engaged in several exchanges with non-
journalist users, they often ignored tweets directed at them by members of the public. In contrast, 
they practically always replied to tweets from other journalists, suggesting a practice of selective 
interaction on Twitter with a preference for engaging with other members of their professional 
community. 
Job tweeting, mutual promotion and the support of other journalists suggest that the 
correspondents were active in using Twitter to build connections with other members of the 
journalistic community, especially with other war correspondents. This community builder role can 
be regarded as being especially afforded by social media. As Mourão (2015) notes, Twitter 
enhances the community-building processes of journalists as they tend to follow each other and 
converse personally across media outlets. Enabling the formation of a professional community may 
be a particularly relevant aspect of Twitter for war correspondents, who operate under extraordinary 
circumstances and personal threat. With their capacity for creating networks of mutual support, 
social media have been found to be a means for ‘(self-)care’ by users during emergencies 
(Kaufmann, 2015). Accordingly, mutual support and exchanges with fellow journalists may 
increase the correspondents’ sense of being part of a community and help them to work through 
their difficult and sometimes even traumatic experiences in the battlefield. 
However, the community builder role directs the correspondents’ attention to a limited 
group of sources. Reinforcing the sense of an ‘interpretive community’ of journalists (Zelizer, 
1993), it helps them to navigate in the field of information warfare by providing them with cues on 
what information and which views are relevant and trustworthy. As Donsbach (2008: 66–68) has 
pointed out, to validate their perceptions of the relevance of an event, the accuracy of the facts and 
the acceptability of opinions, journalists construct a ‘shared reality’ with other journalists, which 
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gives them the confidence to see something 'objectively' as newsworthy, true and plausible. 
Accordingly, by using Twitter to communicate with their fellow reporters, war correspondents may 
not only direct each other’s attention to events and sources of information but also validate opinions 
and interpretations of the events (cf. Revers, 2015: 15). Therefore, even as it potentially exposes 
reporters to a mountain of alternative views, interpretations, facts and disinformation, Twitter may 
paradoxically reinforce the creation of rather uniform interpretations of complex issues, such as the 
Ukraine conflict. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The four role enactments identified in the studied war correspondents’ tweets are summarised in 
Table 1. Each of the roles is associated with certain tweet types and the content categories which 
most conveniently enable that enactment on Twitter. The fourth column lists the primary purposes 
the role enactments serve for correspondents in Twitter’s public space. As the analysis indicates, 
there are several tweet types and various forms of content, i.e. alternative tweeting practices that can 
contribute to the enactment of each of the roles, and, correspondingly, a certain tweet type can 
enable the enactment of more than one role. Depending on the context, by tweeting a link to online 
sources, for instance, a correspondent may enact the role of the interpreter who provides analysis 
and context, or the connector who promotes a fellow correspondent’s work, or both at the same 
time.  
 
Journalistic role Primary tweet types Relevant content Social purposes 
Disseminator original content, retweet, 
link 
first-hand observation, 
live tweeting, quotes, 
headlines, hashtags 
providing independent 
and trustworthy 
information 
Interpreter link, retweet endorsements, views,  
hashtags 
providing analysis, 
points-of-view, context 
Adversary original content, @reply personal opinion, 
irony, fact checking, 
hashtags 
contesting the accounts 
of conflicting parties, 
flagging propaganda, 
denouncing information 
 16 
 
warfare 
Connector @reply, @mention, link, 
retweet 
job talk, support,  
thanking, promotion 
Communal support, 
validation of 
interpretation 
Table 1. War correspondents’ roles and their enactments on Twitter 
 
 
The four roles analysed can be seen as adaptations of the traditional roles of journalists in a new 
kind of technology-mediated public communication environment characterised by instant 
messaging, borderless interaction and information warfare. At the same time, by blurring the lines 
between public and private forms of communication, Twitter often renders journalistic role 
enactments more transparent than those that can usually be found in their news reporting in the ‘old’ 
media (cf. Revers, 2015). The correspondents’ live tweets and photos, for instance, can be 
compared with television reporters’ live reports from the scene, and make it possible for newspaper 
correspondents, too, to extend their role as eyewitnesses. Sharing links to and retweeting views and 
analyses concerning the conflict render the role of the correspondent as an interpreter increasingly 
transparent, as they explicitly show some of the background information and sources of information 
relied on by the reporters. Similarly, discrediting disinformation and the claims of certain parties to 
the conflict makes it manifest to the public how the correspondents work on a daily basis to make 
judgments and evaluate information. Finally, expressing support to fellow reporters renders the 
communal nature of journalism much more evident than it is in traditional news reporting.  
A prominent question regarding the adaptation of social media environments for the 
purposes of journalism concerns the extent to which journalists express personal opinions via 
Twitter and whether it points to the adoption of a more opinionated and involved role for journalists 
in public debate than that traditionally sanctioned by the professional norm of detachment (Lasorsa 
et al., 2012; Molyneux, 2015). The correspondents we analysed certainly expressed personal 
opinions, but they usually did so within distinct boundaries: the opinions concerned the veracity of 
information and aimed at discrediting propagandistic claims and did not often amount to taking an 
explicit stance on the conflict or declaring ‘who is in the right’. Personal opinion was thus 
expressed well within the bounds of the traditional norm of remaining neutral observers as the 
literature on the ‘normalization’ of social media suggests (Singer 2005; Lasorsa et al., 2012). 
Alternatively, the reluctance of the Finnish journalists to express opinion more extensively may also 
reflect the fact that Twitter has been adopted by journalists in Finland more slowly than in the 
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English-speaking countries (Gulyas, 2013) and suggests that Finnish correspondents are still in the 
process of being accustomed to Twitter’s open communicative culture. 
While Twitter largely enables correspondents to enact their traditional roles, the public and 
interactive nature of the medium means that the inherent tensions in the journalistic roles may 
become objects of public controversy in the context of information warfare. Even as the 
correspondents prefer to enact a neutral role with regard to the conflicting parties – primarily 
positioning themselves as impartial disseminators, interpreters and discreditors of propaganda, both 
members of the public and fellow journalists may question the veracity of these positions and 
suggest that the reporting and tweeting of the correspondents, in fact, serves particular interests in 
the conflict. Arguably, it is partly due to this constant threat to the self-conception of the war 
correspondent that the fourth role enabled by the social media, the community builder, has become 
so significant. By allowing the construction of a community of fellow correspondents, the war 
correspondents may validate their interpretations, as well as their perception of themselves as 
independent non-parties to the conflict, and thus be better able to cope with the potentially hostile 
environment of Twitter’s information warfare. 
Social media should be regarded as a set of unique and fruitful environments for the analysis 
of journalistic roles and their development. On the one hand, it enables journalists to control, to a 
certain degree, how they present themselves publicly. On the other hand, Twitter, in particular, 
allows the study of journalistic roles in a context of social interaction, which is essential to any role 
enactment. The four roles outlined in this study emerged as the most salient roles based on our 
observation, but, due to the qualitative and exploratory nature of the analysis, they should not be 
read as an exhaustive typology of the roles available to correspondents on Twitter. Instead, by 
observing how journalistic roles are enacted on Twitter, we have aimed to provide a starting point 
for further research on how conflict reporters adapt to and make use of social media platforms.  
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